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It is a pleasure for me to speak this evening before such
a distinguished group of agribusiness and academic representatives,
all of whom have a common interest.

Twenty years ago, that interes.t

would have been denominated as "agricultural policy".

Today it

would be called "food policy", which presumably is a broader
term.

Food policy is usually defined to encompass the interests

of everyone in the production and marketing process from producer
to consumer.

It is by no means limited geographically, but

encompasses people and firms who are involved -- directly or
indirectly, domestically and internationally - in the food business.
Allegedly, this broad definition is required because those who
worked with agricultural policy a decade or two ago were inordinately
producer oriented.

Perhaps that charge is justified in some

instances, but in my judgment it was the exception rather than
the rule.

Most agribusiness firms and most agricultural policy

experts have always sought to balance the interests of all those
who are intertwined in the food chain.

Nevertheless, "food policy"

is with us for a long time to come, so it behooves all of us
to become actively involved in developing that policy.
Hence, let us turn to some of the major issues of the day.
I will attempt to concentrate on those questions which are of
direct interest to the agribusiness world, but which also have a
research or extension component of significance to the academic
world.

For purposes of organization, I will deal first with issues

that are international in scope, and then those that are primarily
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domestic in their orientation.
I.

International Food Issues
A.

Food Reserves - As you know, international food

stocks were drawn down in the 1972-74 period to what many would
construe as dangerously low levels.

This stimulated an ·enormous

interest in the subject of world hunger.

And it also stimulated

concern about food prices, both here and abroad.

The simplistic

answer offered by most spokesmen on this question is that we
ought to have an international food reserve.

Perhaps these

spokesmen are correct, but most of them scarcely understand
the question, let alone the answer!
If one is to have an international food reserve, one must
first decide whether its basic objective is one of food security,
(i.e., having ample food available to provide a nutritionally
adequate diet to the people of the worl~,, price stability, or
both.

If food security be the sole objective, a reserve need

not be terribly large.

Even in those worrisome days of three

or four years ago, food supplies were ample to meet the basic
needs of everyone in this world.

Where there people suffering

from starvation and malnutrition at that time?

Of course, but

this is also true today, when food supplies are abundant, and
it was true a decade or two ago as well.
distribution, rather than of supply.

This is a problem of

As serious as that problem

may be - and it merits the attention of all of us - it is not a
problem of food security.
Most people who advocate creation of an international food
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reserve really have price stability objectives in mind, though
they cloak their arguments in terms of food security.

The reason

for this is obvious; opposing a food security program is like
challenging God and motherhood!

Constructing an argument on

price stability grounds is, on the other hand, another matter
entirely.

Many people are wary of price stabilization programs,

for they have hardly had a record of unblemished success in the
past.

The International Wheat Agreement, one of our first

attempts at an international food reserve, collapsed about ten
years ago, and its pricing provisions have been inactive since
that time.

We sought to achieve price stability throughout our

entire economy a few years ago when the Cost of Living Counsel
came into being.

But it was a short-lived"institution, and its

record was mixed at best.
At the moment, discussions of an international food reserve
are underway in London, and it is possible that a new agreement
will be negotiated in 1978.

But there are lots of questions

to be answered before that agreement is finalized.

Permit me to

pose a few of them for you.
First, a decision must be made as to whether the agreement
is to include price stability objectives.

If so, a secondary

but critical decision must be made as to whether the agreement
will have minimum and maximum prices (the position of the European
Community, for example) or simply price or quantity guidelines or
triggers (the U.S. position).

If a minimum and maximum price are

to be defended, the spread between those two prices is likewise
of critical importance.

If that spread is relatively wide, only
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limited price stability will be achieved.

But it may be possible

to carry out those limited objectives with a relatively small
buffer stock or reserve.

If, on the other hand, the difference

between the minimum and maximum price is narrowed, greater price
stability can presumably be achieved, but at a much higher cost.
Defending a narrow price corridor will require a large buffer
stock, otherwise the risk of failure will be greatly increased.
A related but critical question in any international food
reserve is "Who picks up the tab?"

In times of surplus, exporters

assume this financial burden as a matter of course.

There is

no motivation for importers to do so, so long as supplies are
readily available from a number of sources.

Since surpluses have

been the dominant situation during the post-World War II period,
importers argue that exporting nations should bear most of the
financial burden of a formal food reserve.

Exporters, on the

other hand, argue that times are changing, population is increasing,
and food security could become the world's greatest challenge
over the next two or three decades.

If so, importers should bear

most of the cost of a formal food reserve.

Thus, the negotiating

lines are drawn, and only time will tell how this financial
burden will be distributed.
Management of a food reserve is also a key question.

Is this

function to be centralized, or will each participating nation
provide its own management?

In either case, are management decisions

to be automatic, in accordance with the rules of the agreement, or is
there to be some discretion exercised in building and releasing
stocks?

Are the lesser developed nations to become participants in
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such a program and, if so, how are their financial obligations
to be met?

Will a reserve encompass only food grains (i.e., wheat,

rice, or both), or will it also include feed grains?

Can an

international food reserve be operated successfully, without the
cooperation of the Soviet Union?

If not, can the Soviets be

induced to participate by the use of carrot and/or stick provisions
of the agreement?
with the agreement?

Are there to be penalties for noncompliance
If so, how are those penalties to be enforced?

One could pose a number of additional questions on food
reserves, but the above should suffice to indicate that this is
a most complex and intricate question.
B.

International Trade - We are now in the midst of

the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva,
Switzerland.

This is a ninety nation exercise, the largest of

its kind in the history of the world.

Though innumerable issues

are involved, a few are worthy of particular attention in the
context of international food policy.
One of these, for example, is what kind of ''special and
differentiated treatment" is to be provided for the lesser
developed nations under the rules of the GATT (the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)?

As you know, foreign aid is no

longer a popular program here in the United States.

Nor is it

terribly popular in many of the other developed nations of the
world.

How then do we meet our humanitarian obligations to

the less fortunate nations and peoples of the world?
answer is "more trade, less aid".

Our usual

The LDC's have responded by

saying "Fine, but that is meaningless rhetoric unless you are
-5-

prepared to open your markets to us".

ifuat specific actions

are we, the developed nations, prepared to take on behalf of our
less fortunate brethren?

Are we, for example, prepared to restrain

our own use of export subsidies, but permit the LDC's to use
export subsidies at will?

When we. apply "safeguard actions" against

an influx of foreign imports, are we prepared to exempt the LDC's
from such actions?

When we design a "voluntary restraint program"

for beef imports, are we prepared to treat the LDC's differently
from an Australia or a New Zealand?

When a tariff formula is

implemented in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, are we
prepared to make deeper than formula cuts on products of particular
interest to the LDC's?

Are we prepared to participate in inter-

national commodity agreements on a whole host of products, knowing
that the LDC's wish to use those agreements to raise the international prices of their raw materials?

Are we prepared to

bear a significant share of the cost of maintaining buffer stocks
that are established under international commodity agreements?
Are we prepared to extend duty free treatmen~ on a whole host of
agricultural and non-agricultural cor:uuodities under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) program?
All of the above questions must be answered by our negotiators,
and the negotiators of other developed nations, over the next twelve
to eighteen months.

These issues are of immense importance to

the entire world, for billions of dollars of trade are at stake.
The Geneva negotiations could well have a more significant impact
on U.S. agriculture than anything else that takes place in this
country or abroad during the next twenty or thirty years.
-6-

What a

fertile field this is for academic research as well.

Predicting

the domestic and international impact of these potential changes
in the structure of international trade is an enticing but tremendously
formidable task.
C.

Market Development - Aside from what might occur in

international negotiations, we still have an immediate shortrun
interest in expanding U.S. agricultural exports.

No one in the

agricultural community is comfortable with the present level of
carry-over stocks that we have in this country.

Farm prices are

inordinately low, and we need to take whatever actions are
feasible to correct the situation.

Obviously, one way of relieving

the economic pressure on our agricultural sector is to expand
exports.

This can be done through:

(1) combined governmental-

private sector initiatives in market development;

(2) expanded

use of CCC Credit; and (3) increased commitments under P.L. 480,
the Food for Peace Program.

Secretary Bergland is cognizant of

these possibilities, and has begun to respond to them.

He recently

announced that CCC Credit has been increased from $750,000,000 per
year to $1.5 billion, and that market development funds in the
Foreign Agriculture Service will also be increased.

This is good

news, and hopefully the Food for Peace allocations will also be
expanded.
Though these short-term actions are most appropriate, it would
be wise to examine the long-term implications of such programs to
U.S. agriculture.

Are they beneficial?

cost return do they provide?

If so, what kind of benefit-

Where government funds are involved,

how does the return on those funds compare to expenditures made on
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our basic domestic farm programs?

P.L. 480, for example, involves

a combination of grant and loan programs.
grants and fewer loans?

Or vice versa?

at extremely favorable interest rates.
or shortened?

Should there be more
The loans are long·-term,

Should the term be lengthened

Should the rate of interest be increased or decreased?

Do P. L. 480 programs inordinately depress agricultural production
in the recipient countries?
to U.S. farmers?

Is this advantageous or disadvantageous

Should we be using P.L. 480 funds to increase

agricultural production in the lesser developed recipient nations,
as is present policy, or will this simply make them competitors
with U.S. agriculture in the future?

P.L. 480 programs in Korea,

Taiwan, and Spain have evolved into excellent corr~ercial markets
for U.S. farmers.

Can this success be duplicated in other lesser

developed nations of the world?

If so, should we be pinpointing

our P.L. 480 programs toward that market development end?
We might also ask ourselves whether we can improve our
commercial sales performance throughout the world.

Can we capture

an increased share of the world market from our competitor exporting
nations?

If so, how do we go about doing so?

Is it simply a

matter of becoming more efficient in our own production and
marketing processes, thereby enhancing our international competitiveness
Or is there more to it than that?
techniques?

Do we need to improve our marketing

Do we need more sales representatives around the world,

and a higher level of market intelligence?

Do we know how to adjust

to the cultural requirements of a purchasing nation?

Can we achieve

the salesmanship successes with agricultural products that the
Japanese and others have achieved with a whole gamut of industrial
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and commercial goods?

Do we have the kind of institutional

framework that will permit us to dramatically expand our international sales efforts?
A decade ago, the above questions might not have been
considered crucial to the economic well-being of the United States.
At that time, only four or five percent of our gross national
product was accounted for by international trade.

Though that

figure has doubled over the past several years, international
commerce is still not a life or death proposition for us.

We

can maintain a relatively high standard of living for our people
even if we are singularly unsuccessful in our international
sales efforts.

Nevertheless, those questions are extremely

critical to U.S. agriculture, which is far more dependent upon
international trade for its well-being than is our industrial
sector.

And they are becoming more and more important to the

nation as a whole, with trade becoming an increasingly pervasive
element of our economic system.

Therefore, it behooves us to

search for answers to these questions at a very early date.
II.

Domestic Food Issues

Enough on the international side.

Let us now turn our

attention to a few of the most significant domestic food policy
issues of the day.
A.

Basic Farm Legislation - Though the 1977 Farm Bill

has now been signed into law, and though it builds on previous
legislation passed in 1970 and 1973, it is still not well understood.

Groups such as yours can play a major role in achieving an

increased level of understanding of the legislation, and the political-9-

economic tradeoffs that are encompassed therein.
In my judgment, our basic agricultural policy framework is
sound.

I would not trade it for that of any other nation in the

world.

The inuerests of both producers and consumers are balanced

in the system of target p~ices, loan rates, set aside programs,
etc. that are built into our present law.
lot of unrest.

But there is still a

The unhappiness of producers is evidenced by the

proposed farmers' strike for December 14.

And let food prices

increase. by 1 or 2 percent in a given month, and we will have
four column headlines on that issue in all our major newspapers.
So a tremendous educational and informational job remains to be
done.
With producers, the major challenge is to explain that
basic income protection is to be achieved through target prices
and not through loan rates.

We simply cannot afford to raise

loan rates to a point where we lose our international competitiveness.
Were we to make that mistake, the results would be devastating.
We did make that mistake in the 1950's and 60's, and the results
were devastating - but farmers have short memories!
From the producers' standpoint, we also have the question
of dealing with indexes.

For years, the basic farm policy goal

of most farmers was to achieve parity.

Anyone with a smattering

of knowledge on the subject knows that parity is an outmoded
concept, but it has taken half a century to work our way out of
that bind, and we still have not fully done so.
"Cost of production" seems now to be in vogue as an index
alternative to parity.

But it too has its shortcomings, particularly
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when one attempts to include fixed costs such as land in the
definition.

If cost of production is to be used as a base for

determining target prices in the future, it will have to be
refined a whole lot more than has been done to date.
One of the principal educational challenges in the domestic
farm policy arena lies with achieving an understanding of the
numerous trade-offs that are required, and how, when, and where
they are made.

For example, target prices are a trade-off between

producers and taxpayers.

The higher the level, the greater the

income protection for farmers, but the potential price tag is
obviously higher.

Consumers are a part of that trade-off too,

for higher target prices presumably will stimulate increased
production by farmers
least in the long run.

and lower food prices for consumers, at
Loan rates involve an even more complex

set of trade-offs, because of their international implications.
If and when our loan rates exceed world market prices, we tend
to isolate ourselves from that market.

To the extent we do so

by increasing our own stocks, supply elsewhere is reduced (at
least in the short run) and food prices will tend to rise.

Thus,

consumers in other nations are adversely affected by our policies,
and so are U.S. consumers unless the government is prepared to
move the stocks into the market place at a loss.

If that is done,

taxpayers become involved in the trade-off since they must bear
the losses.
costs.

Taxpayers are involved too in bearing the storage

Producers are temporary beneficiaries, for they can sell

their product at no less than the loan ra~e, which presumably is
above the equilibrium market price.
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Then there are short run and

long run trade·-offs.

High loan rates in the U.S. are likely to

stimulate additional production in the U.S. and elsewhere, leading
to surpluses a few years down the road, with a concomitant
decrease in farm prices and perhaps (but with less assurance)
also a decrease in food prices.

A set-aside program or other

production restraints may, of course, be used to reduce the
pressure on target prices and loan rates.

If production is

successfully restrained, the market price of agricultural
products should rise, thereby reducing or eliminating deficiency
payments to farmers that might otherwise be necessary.

Effective

restraint will also reduce or eliminate government holdings of
grain under the loan program.

Taxpayers will benefit from such

restraint, particularly if compliance with the restraint program
can be achieved at little or no cost.

Less food will be produced,

however, so food costs presumably will be higher.

Consumers,

therefore, are likely to have higher food prices and lower taxes.
Whether they will come out better or worse in the trade-off will
obviously vary from one household to another.
Will it not be exceedingly difficult to explain all this to
a housewife?

Of course, but it is worth doing.

In a democratic

society such as ours, one must assume that a higher level of
knowledge will lead to more reasonable and rational policy making.
B.

Consumer Relations - Consumer relations are an inherent

element of the agricultural policy trade-offs that I have just
discussed.

But there are other aspects of your relationship with

the consumer sector that demand attention too.

Food is a bargain in

the United States; it has been for many years, and will probably be
-12-

But that point has not been well made.

so for years to come.

Most housewives are just not convinced, even when they are
told that on the average only 16 percent of their family budget
goes for food.
too.

Somehow we need to raise that level of understanding

Just think what it would mean to the agricultural sector

of this country if American housewives willingly adjusted their
spending priorities and boosted food to the 20 percent level.
Consumers are also concerned about health risks today.
have had a constant

They

bombardment of material on- the risks of

carcinogens, hormones, additives, cholesterol, and a whole host
of similar

items,

all of which are health related in some way.

The issues have been senationalized in the press, and many of
the studies have been either inconsistent or of questionable
validity.

One must always wonder about the accuracy of interpolating·

laboratory results involving test animals to a real world situation
involving human beings.

Nevertheless, we in agriculture are sometimes

too wont to dismiss these concerns out of hand, rather than facing
up to them.

We are often too much on the defensive, and insufficiently

responsive to the legitimate concerns of our fellow man.

It is

imperative that we meet these issues head on, with full recognition
that these are concerns of customers of ours, which therefore must
be satisfied.
In some areas of consumer interest, the pendulum of response
has gone all the way to the other extreme.

In other words, we have

probably begun to do too much for consumers, rather than too little.
For example, we may eventually have so much background material
on consumer labels that the American housewives will become totally
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confused.

Those housewives are intelligent people, and they

have unquestionably been underinformed, if not misinformed, in
the past.

But their time has a value too, so let us not inundate

them with information that will be of little value in their
purchasing decisions.
Finally, those of us in the agricultural sector need to learn
how to communicate effectively with consumer groups.

We spend far

too much time talking to each other about how efficient we are,
and what a magnificent production and marketing system we have.
But how many of us have communicated directly and openingly with
the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, or any of
the other major consumer advocate groups.

There is a lot for us

to learn in understanding consumers, whether they be militant or
not, and still more for us to learn in communicating our story
to them.

As Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Carol Foreman

has often said, it would be well for farmers, consumers, and even
the illusive "middlemen" to spend more time emphasizing their
mutual interests rather than their points of conflict.
C.

The Middleman - In general, both producers and

consumers stand high in public opinion in this country.

Both

are able to engender a great deal of political support for their
views and in response to their problems.

The

11

middleman 11 on the

other hand, see~s always to be the villian of the piece.

Whether

he be a processor, a transporter, a distributor, or the performer
of any other function in the marketing process, he is chastised
when food prices rise.

The middleman is criticized for being

inefficient, monopolistic, predatory, and the perpetrator of
-14-

nearly every economic ill known to our capitalistic system.
In the vast majority of cases, this criticism is totally unfair
and ill-founded.

But it is a fact of life nevertheless, and the

agribusiness entities involved have a most serious image problem
which must be confronted.
Without question, we have the best agricultural marketing
system in the world.
anything.

It can be improved, of course, but so can

This has been an amazingly innovative segment of the

food chain, characterized by excellent responsiveness to consumer
demands.

Processing, packaging, and distribution techniques have

all changed tremendously over the past several years.

Yet, for

some reason, all these improvements, innovations, and imaginative
new techniques are rarely attributed to the "middleman".

Our

processing and marketing firms simply have not received credit
for their accomplishments.

That too is an educatfonal process,

but it must be coupled with still further advancements in the
future.

Like everyone else, consumers want to know what we have

done for them today!

That means that we must continue our research

and development efforts in all phases of the marketing process new packaging techniques, such as boxed beef, new means for extending
shelf life, such as irradiation; improved acceptability of
preservation techniques, such as freezing; increased transportation
efficiency through improvements in the regulatory process (the
backhaul issue, for example), etc.
D.

The Fast Food Phenomenon - The most spectacular

splash on the food marketing scene in recent years has come from
the fast food industry.

This has been an incredible development,
-15-

with enormous implications for all of us.

Those implications

can be turned into exceedingly profitable opportunities if we
adjust to what has transpired and will continue to transpire.
But we will have to adjust quickly and decisively, or the world
will pass us by.
a short-term fad.

In my judgment, the fast food business is not
It very likely represents a permanent and

..z..

induring shift in the food consumption habits of the American

people.

Perhaps even more importantly, that shift is already

making itself known in many other countries.
The shotgun approach to production and marketing simply
will not work in the fast food sector.

The demand at the retail

level is for large volumes of particular food products, produ~ed
and processed in accordance with detailed specifications.

This is

the rifle approach, of course, and those of us in the food chain
will have to respond with pinpoint accuracy to our customers'
needs.

Those who do so will have an opportunity to share in the

spectacular earnings of one of our most dynamic economic sectors.
Those who are unable to do so will likely find themselves subject
to a shrinking market in years to come.
E.

New Technology - I would be remiss if I were to

close a session such as this without emphasizing the continued
need for technological advances in the production and marketing
sector.

I have already alluded to the latter, but let us not

forget the former even though we are presently in a surplus situation.
The energy crisis will adversely affect agricultural production in
this country and elsewhere for many years to come.
to that distasteful fact in a variety of ways.

-16-

We must adjust

Some of those ways

are already at hand.

Minimum tillage is perhaps the most obvious.

But there are others; for example, we already knew- how to produce
crops with a lot less irrigation water than has typically been
applied.

And we certainly know how to harvest crops for ensilage,

rather than expending vast amounts of energy to dry thBm.

But there

are undoubtedly additional advancements in both production and
management techniques that could further reduce the consumption
of energy on the farm.

The same will undoubtedly hold for such

usage in the processing and marketing areas of the food chain.
Finally, there is a great need for improved technology and
management in the marketing decisions of farmers.

Due at least

partially to our earlier agricultural policies, farmers have
always concentrated primarily on production and secondarily
on marketing.

The latter was not very difficult or challenging,

of course, so long as the government was the major buyer, and
this was done at essentially a fixed price.

Now, however, the

government is less involved in the marketing decisions of individual
farmers, and this makes it essential that those farmers learn how
to evaluate market conditions, hedge their risks, etc.

There are

already many techniques available - forward contracting, use of
the futures markets, pooling, etc.
surface with these.

But we have just scratched the

In the language of the computer world, we are

just in the first generation of agricultural marketing models.
Both the academic world and the business world have a major role
to play in moving to a second and third generation of farm marketing
techniques.

I expect that we will see a tremendous evolution in

this entire area over the next five or ten years.
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If we do this job

well, the entire food chain will operate more effectively than
it does today.
III.

Conclusion

There are many other isuses which could be covered.

For

example, the whole subject of nutrition is receiving increased
emphasis at the Federal level today.

So is the matter of

increased competition in all our industries.

We have talked

little about improving conversion ratios in our livestock and
poultry sector.

Much more could be said about featherbedding

and other labor practices that reduce efficiency and hamper
technological change.

But I believe we have touched on most of

the major issues of the day.

If agricultural businesses and

academic institutions in Minnesota and elsewhere will work
together on problems and issues such as these, we should be able
to promise the people of this nation and the world a constantly
improving food industry.
Good luck!
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